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MGIC INVESTMENT CORP
Form 8-K
March 20, 2008

UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C. 20549

FORM 8-K

CURRENT REPORT

Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934

Date of Report
(Date of earliest
event reported): March 14, 2008

MGIC Investment Corporation

(Exact name of registrant as specified in its charter)

Wisconsin	1-10816	39-1486475
(State or other jurisdiction of incorporation)	(Commission File Number)	(IRS Employer Identification No.)

MGIC Plaza, 250 East Kilbourn Avenue, Milwaukee, WI 53202

(Address of principal executive offices, including zip code)

(414) 347-6480

(Registrant's telephone number, including area code)

Not Applicable

(Former name or former address, if changed since last report)

Check the appropriate box below if the Form 8-K filing is intended to simultaneously satisfy the filing obligation of the registrant under any of the following provisions:

- Written communications pursuant to Rule 425 under the Securities Act (17 CFR 230.425)
- Soliciting material pursuant to Rule 14a-12 under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.14a-12)
- Pre-commencement communications pursuant to Rule 14d-2(b) under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.14d-2(b))
- Pre-commencement communications pursuant to Rule 13e-4(c) under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.13e-4(c))

Item 1.01. Entry into a Material Definitive Agreement.

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On March 14, 2008, we entered into Amendment No. 1 (the Amendment) to our Five-Year Credit Agreement between MGIC Investment Corporation, BNP Paribas, as administrative agent for the lenders, and the lenders named therein (the Credit Agreement). Prior to the Amendment, the Credit Agreement required us to maintain a consolidated shareholders' equity balance of no less than \$2.25 billion at any time. The Amendment modified the shareholders' equity requirement to require us to maintain a consolidated shareholders' equity balance of no less than \$2.25 billion at any time prior to March 31, 2008 and after July 1, 2008, and no less than \$1.85 billion during the period between March 31, 2008 through and including July 1, 2008. Our current forecast of our 2008 net loss would not reduce our forecasted shareholders' equity (which does not give effect to any offering of equity or equity equivalent securities or the potential sale of our interests in Sherman Financial Group LLC (Sherman)) below \$2.25 billion. However, recent volatility in the bond market, particularly the municipal bond market, has increased the likelihood that changes in fair values of our portfolio, which flow through our other comprehensive income, could reduce shareholders' equity below \$2.25 billion. As of February 29, 2008, changes in the municipal bond yield curve since year-end 2007 had the effect of reducing the market value of our investment portfolio, which decreased other comprehensive income on the order of \$100 million when compared to the portfolio's value at year-end. A copy of the Amendment is filed as Exhibit 4.5.1 to our 10-K/A for the year ended December 31, 2007 filed on March 18, 2008 and is incorporated herein by reference.

Safe Harbor Statement

Forward-Looking Statements and Risk Factors:

Our revenues, losses and shareholders' equity could be affected by the risk factors discussed below that are applicable to us, and our income from joint ventures could be affected by the risk factors discussed below that are applicable to Sherman. These risk factors should be reviewed in connection with this report and our other periodic reports to the Securities and Exchange Commission. These factors may also cause actual results to differ materially from the results contemplated by forward-looking statements that we may make. Forward-looking statements consist of statements which relate to matters other than historical fact, including our statements regarding our projected losses and shareholders' equity. We are not undertaking any obligation to update any forward-looking statements we may make even though these statements may be affected by events or circumstances occurring after the forward-looking statements were made. No investor should rely on the fact that such statements are current at any time other than the time at which this report was issued.

A downturn in the domestic economy or deterioration in home prices in the segment of the market we serve may result in more homeowners defaulting and our losses increasing.

Losses result from events that reduce a borrower's ability to continue to make mortgage payments, such as unemployment, and whether the home of a borrower who defaults on his mortgage can be sold for an amount that will cover unpaid principal and interest and the expenses of the sale. Favorable economic conditions generally reduce the likelihood that borrowers will lack sufficient income to pay their mortgages and also favorably affect the value of homes, thereby reducing and in some cases even eliminating a loss from a mortgage default. A deterioration in economic conditions generally increases the likelihood that borrowers will not have sufficient income to pay their mortgages and can also adversely affect housing values, which in turn can influence the willingness of borrowers with sufficient resources to make mortgage payments to do so when the mortgage balance exceeds the value of the home. Housing values may decline even absent a deterioration in economic conditions due to declines in demand for homes, which in turn may result from changes in buyers' perceptions of the potential for future appreciation, restrictions on mortgage credit due to more stringent underwriting standards or other factors. Recently, the residential mortgage market in the United States has experienced a variety of worsening economic conditions and housing prices in many areas have declined or stopped appreciating after extended periods of significant appreciation. A significant deterioration in economic conditions or an extended period of flat or declining housing values may result in increased losses which would materially affect our results of operations and financial condition.

The mix of business we write also affects the likelihood of losses occurring.

Certain types of mortgages have higher probabilities of claims. These segments include loans with loan-to-value ratios over 95% (including loans with 100% loan-to-value ratios), FICO credit scores below 620, limited underwriting, including limited borrower documentation, or total debt-to-income ratios of 38% or higher, as well as loans having combinations of higher risk factors. In recent years, the percentage of our volume written on a flow basis that includes these segments has continued to increase. As of December 31, 2007, approximately 57.6% of our primary risk in force consisted of loans with loan-to-value ratios equal to or greater than 95%, 11.6% with FICO credit scores below 620, and 14.7% with limited underwriting, including limited borrower documentation.

As of December 31, 2007, approximately 5% of our primary risk in force written through the flow channel, and 53% of our primary risk in force written through the bulk channel, consisted of adjustable rate mortgages in which the initial interest rate may be adjusted during the five years after the mortgage closing (ARMs). We classify as fixed rate loans adjustable rate mortgages in which the initial interest rate is fixed during the five years after the mortgage closing. We believe that when the reset interest rate significantly exceeds the interest rate at loan origination, claims on ARMs would be substantially higher than for fixed rate loans. Moreover, even if interest rates remain unchanged, claims on ARMs with a teaser rate (an initial interest rate that does not fully reflect the index which determines subsequent rates) may also be substantially higher because of the increase in the mortgage payment that will occur when the fully indexed rate becomes effective. In addition, we believe the volume of interest-only loans, which may also be ARMs, and loans with negative amortization features, such as pay option

The mix of business we write also affects the likelihood of losses occurring.

ARMs, increased in 2005 and 2006 and remained at these levels during the first half of 2007, before declining in the second half of 2007. Because interest-only loans and pay option ARMs are a relatively recent development, we have no meaningful data on their historical performance. We believe claim rates on certain of these loans will be substantially higher than on loans without scheduled payment increases that are made to borrowers of comparable credit quality.

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Although we attempt to incorporate these higher expected claim rates into our underwriting and pricing models, there can be no assurance that the premiums earned and the associated investment income will prove adequate to compensate for actual losses from these loans.

Because we establish loss reserves only upon a loan default rather than based on estimates of our ultimate losses, our earnings may be adversely affected by losses disproportionately in certain periods.

In accordance with GAAP for the mortgage insurance industry, we establish loss reserves only for loans in default. Reserves are established for reported insurance losses and loss adjustment expenses based on when notices of default on insured mortgage loans are received. Reserves are also established for estimated losses incurred on notices of default that have not yet been reported to us by the servicers (this is what is referred to as IBNR in the mortgage insurance industry). We establish reserves using estimated claims rates and claims amounts in estimating the ultimate loss. Because our reserving method does not take account of the impact of future losses that could occur from loans that are not delinquent, our obligation for ultimate losses that we expect to occur under our policies in force at any period end is not reflected in our financial statements, except in the case where a premium deficiency exists. As a result, future losses may have a material impact on future results as losses emerge.

Loss reserve estimates are subject to uncertainties and paid claims may substantially exceed our loss reserves.

We establish reserves using estimated claim rates and claim amounts in estimating the ultimate loss. The estimated claim rates and claim amounts represent what we believe best reflect the estimate of what will actually be paid on the loans in default as of the reserve date.

The establishment of loss reserves is subject to inherent uncertainty and requires judgment by management. The actual amount of the claim payments may be substantially higher than our loss reserve estimates. Our estimates could be adversely affected by several factors, including a deterioration of regional or national economic conditions leading to a reduction in borrowers' income and thus their ability to make mortgage payments, and a drop in housing values that could materially reduce our ability to mitigate potential loss through property acquisition and resale or expose us to greater loss on resale of properties obtained through the claim settlement process. Changes to our estimates could result in material changes to our results of operations, even in a stable economic environment, and there can be no assurance that actual claims paid by us will not substantially exceed our loss reserves.

Our shareholders' equity could fall below the minimum amount required under our bank debt.

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We have drawn the entire \$300 million available under our bank revolving credit facility which matures in March 2010. This facility requires that we maintain shareholders' equity of \$2.250 billion, except that under a March 2008 amendment to the facility we need only maintain shareholders' equity of \$1.850 billion during the period March 31, 2008 through July 1, 2008. At December 31, 2007, our shareholders' equity was \$2.594 billion. We expect we will have a net loss in 2008, with the result that we expect our shareholders' equity to decline. Our current forecast of our 2008 net loss would not reduce our forecasted shareholders' equity (which does not give effect to this offering, the concurrent convertible debenture offering or the potential sale of our interests in Sherman) below \$2.250 billion. There can be no assurance that our actual results will not be materially worse than our forecast or that losses in future years, if they occur, will not reduce our shareholders' equity below the minimum amount required under our bank revolving credit facility. In addition, regardless of our results of operations, our shareholders' equity would be reduced to the extent the carrying value of our investment portfolio declines from its carrying value at December 31, 2007 due to market value adjustments and to the extent we pay dividends to our shareholders. At December 31, 2007, the modified duration of our fixed income portfolio was 4.8 years, which means that an instantaneous parallel shift in the yield curve of 100 basis points would result in a change of 4.8% (approximately \$280 million) in the market value of this portfolio. For an upward shift in the yield curve, the market value of this portfolio would decrease, and for a downward shift in the yield curve, the market value would increase. Recent volatility in the bond market, particularly the municipal bond market, has increased the likelihood that changes in fair values of our portfolio, which flow through our other comprehensive income, could reduce shareholders' equity below \$2.250 billion. As of February 29, 2008, changes in the municipal bond yield curve since year-end 2007 had the effect of reducing the market value of our investment portfolio, which decreased other comprehensive income on the order of \$100 million when compared to the portfolio's value at year-end. Market value adjustments could also occur as a result of changes in credit spreads. At our current annual dividend rate, approximately \$8.2 million would be paid in dividends in 2008.

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If we did not meet the minimum shareholders' equity requirement and are not successful obtaining an agreement from banks holding a majority of the debt outstanding under the facility to change (or waive) this requirement, banks holding a majority of the debt outstanding under the facility would have the right to declare the entire amount of the outstanding debt due and payable. If the debt under our bank facility were accelerated in this manner, the holders of 25% or more of our publicly traded \$200 million 5.625% senior notes due in September 2011, and the holders of 25% or more of our publicly traded \$300 million 5.375% senior notes due in November 2015, each would have the right to accelerate the maturity of that debt. In addition, the trustee of these two issues of senior notes, which is also a lender under our bank credit facility, could, independent of any action by holders of senior notes, accelerate the maturity of the senior notes. In the event the amounts owing under our revolving credit facility or any series of our outstanding senior notes are accelerated, we may not have sufficient funds to repay any such amounts.

The premiums we charge may not be adequate to compensate us for our liabilities for losses and as a result any inadequacy could materially affect our financial condition and results of operations.

We set premiums at the time a policy is issued based on our expectations regarding likely performance over the long-term. Generally, we cannot cancel the mortgage insurance coverage or adjust renewal premiums during the life of a mortgage insurance policy. As a result, higher than anticipated claims generally cannot be offset by premium increases on policies in force or mitigated by our non-renewal or cancellation of insurance coverage. The premiums we charge, and the associated investment income, may not be adequate to compensate us for the risks and costs associated with the insurance coverage provided to customers. An increase in the number or size of claims, compared to what we anticipate, could adversely affect our results of operations or financial condition.

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On January 22, 2008, we announced that we had decided to stop writing the portion of our bulk business that insures loans which are included in Wall Street securitizations because the performance of loans included in such securitizations deteriorated materially in the fourth quarter of 2007 and this deterioration was materially worse than we experienced for loans insured through the flow channel or loans insured through the remainder of our bulk channel. On February 13, 2008, we announced that we had established a premium deficiency reserve of approximately \$1.2 billion. This amount is the present value of expected future losses and expenses that exceeded the present value of expected future premium and already established loss reserves on these hulk transactions.

There can be no assurance that additional premium deficiency reserves on other portions of our insurance portfolio will not be required.

The amount of insurance we write could be adversely affected if lenders and investors select alternatives to private mortgage insurance.

These alternatives to private mortgage insurance include:

lenders and other investors holding mortgages in portfolio and self-insuring,

investors using credit enhancements other than private mortgage insurance, using other credit enhancements in conjunction with reduced levels of private mortgage insurance coverage, or accepting credit risk without credit enhancement,

lenders using government mortgage insurance programs, including those of the Federal Housing Administration and the Veterans Administration, and

lenders originating mortgages using piggyback structures to avoid private mortgage insurance, such as a first mortgage with an 80% loan-to-value ratio and a second mortgage with a 10%, 15% or 20% loan-to-value ratio (referred to as 80-10-10, 80-15-5 or 80-20 loans, respectively) rather than a first mortgage with a 90%, 95% or 100% loan-to-value ratio that has private mortgage insurance.

Our financial strength rating could be downgraded below Aa3/AA-, which could reduce the volume of our new business writings.

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The mortgage insurance industry has historically viewed a financial strength rating of Aa3/AA- as critical to writing new business. In part this view has resulted from the mortgage insurer eligibility requirements of the Federal National Mortgage Association, commonly known as Fannie Mae, and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, commonly known as Freddie Mac. We refer to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac collectively as the government-sponsored entities or GSEs. Each year the GSEs purchase the majority of loans insured by us and the rest of the mortgage insurance industry. The eligibility requirements define the standards under which the GSEs will accept mortgage insurance as a credit

Our financial strength rating could be downgraded below Aa3/AA-, which could reduce the volume of our new business

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enhancement on mortgages they acquire. These standards impose additional restrictions on insurers that do not have a financial strength rating of at least Aa3/AA-. These restrictions include not permitting such insurers to engage in captive reinsurance transactions with lenders. For many years, captive reinsurance has been an important means through which mortgage insurers compete for business from lenders, including lenders who sell a large volume of mortgages to the GSEs. In February 2008 Freddie Mac announced that it was temporarily suspending the portion of its eligibility requirements that impose additional restrictions on a mortgage insurer that is downgraded below Aa3/AA- if the affected insurer commits to submitting a complete remediation plan for its approval. In February 2008 Fannie Mae advised us that it would not automatically impose additional restrictions on a mortgage insurer that is downgraded below Aa3/AA- if the affected insurer submits a written remediation plan. Such remediation plans must be submitted to Freddie Mac within 90 days of the downgrade and to Fannie Mae within 30 days of the downgrade. There can be no assurance that Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae will continue these positions or that, if we are downgraded below Aa3/AA-, we will be able to submit acceptable remediation plans to them in a timely manner.

Apart from the effect of the eligibility requirements of the GSEs, we believe lenders who hold mortgages in portfolio and choose to obtain mortgage insurance on the loans assess a mortgage insurer's financial strength rating as one element of the process through which they select mortgage insurers. As a result of these considerations, a mortgage insurer that is rated less than Aa3/AA- may be competitively disadvantaged.

The financial strength of Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Corporation (MGIC), our principal mortgage insurance subsidiary, is rated AA by Fitch Ratings. In late February 2008 Fitch announced that it was placing MGIC's rating on rating watch negative. Fitch said the present stressful mortgage environment has resulted in a modeled capital shortfall for [MGIC] at the AA rating threshold. If within the next several months, MGIC is able to obtain additional capital resources to address this shortfall, Fitch would expect to affirm MGIC's ratings, with a Negative Rating Outlook, reflecting the financial stress associated with the present mortgage environment. Assuming MGIC does not raise additional capital to support its franchise, Fitch will downgrade MGIC's rating to AA-.

The financial strength of MGIC is rated AA- by Standard & Poor's Rating Services. In late January 2008, S&P placed MGIC on creditwatch with negative implications, which we understand means there is a greater than 50% chance of a downgrade. We understand that the financial strength rating of a mortgage insurer depends on factors beyond the adequacy of its capital to withstand very high loss scenarios, such as its risk management discipline as perceived by the agency assigning the rating. Because we do not believe the additional capital we are raising will influence S&P's view of our financial strength rating, we believe it is likely that at the conclusion of S&P's review MGIC's rating will be downgraded. The financial strength of MGIC is rated Aa2 by Moody's Investors Service, which is also reviewing MGIC's rating for possible downgrade.

Competition or changes in our relationships with our customers could reduce our revenues or increase our losses.

Competition for private mortgage insurance premiums occurs not only among private mortgage insurers but also with mortgage lenders through captive mortgage reinsurance transactions. In these transactions, a lender's affiliate reinsures a portion of the insurance written by a private mortgage insurer on mortgages originated or serviced by the lender. As discussed under - We are subject to risk from private litigation and regulatory proceedings below, we provided information to the New York Insurance Department and the Minnesota Department of Commerce about captive mortgage reinsurance arrangements. Other insurance departments or other officials, including attorneys general, may also seek information about or investigate captive mortgage reinsurance.

The level of competition within the private mortgage insurance industry has also increased as many large mortgage lenders have reduced the number of private mortgage insurers with whom they do business. At the same time, consolidation among mortgage lenders has increased the share of the mortgage lending market held by large lenders.

Our private mortgage insurance competitors include:

PMI Mortgage Insurance Company,

Genworth Mortgage Insurance Corporation,

United Guaranty Residential Insurance Company,

Radian Guaranty Inc.,

Republic Mortgage Insurance Company, whose parent, based on information filed with the SEC through February 29, 2008, is our largest shareholder,

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Triad Guaranty Insurance Corporation, and

CMG Mortgage Insurance Company.

Our relationships with our customers could be adversely affected by a variety of factors, including the adoption of our new underwriting guidelines, which will result in our declining to insure some of the loans originated by our customers.

While the mortgage insurance industry has not had new entrants in many years, it is possible that positive business fundamentals combined with the deterioration of the financial strength ratings of the existing mortgage insurance companies could encourage the formation of start-up mortgage insurers.

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If interest rates decline, house prices appreciate or mortgage insurance cancellation requirements change, the length of time that our policies remain in force could decline and result in declines in our revenue.

In each year, most of our premiums are from insurance that has been written in prior years. As a result, the length of time insurance remains in force, which is also generally referred to as persistency, is a significant determinant of our revenues. The factors affecting the length of time our insurance remains in force include:

the level of current mortgage interest rates compared to the mortgage coupon rates on the insurance in force, which affects the vulnerability of the insurance in force to refinancings, and

mortgage insurance cancellation policies of mortgage investors along with the rate of home price appreciation experienced by the homes underlying the mortgages in the insurance in force.

During the 1990s, our year-end persistency ranged from a high of 87.4% at December 31, 1990 to a low of 68.1% at December 31, 1998. At December 31, 2007 persistency was at 76.4%, compared to the record low of 44.9% at September 30, 2003. Over the past several years, refinancing has become easier to accomplish and less costly for many consumers. Hence, even in an interest rate environment favorable to persistency improvement, we do not expect persistency will reach its December 31, 1990 level.

If the volume of low down payment home mortgage originations declines, the amount of insurance that we write could decline, which would reduce our revenues.

The factors that affect the volume of low-down-payment mortgage originations include:

the level of home mortgage interest rates,

the health of the domestic economy as well as conditions in regional and local economies,

housing affordability,

population trends, including the rate of household formation,

the rate of home price appreciation, which in times of heavy refinancing can affect whether refinance loans have loan-to-value ratios that require private mortgage insurance, and

government housing policy encouraging loans to first-time homebuyers.

Changes in the business practices of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac could reduce our revenues or increase our losses.

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Changes in the business practices of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac could reduce our revenues or increase our losses.

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The majority of our insurance written through the flow channel is for loans sold to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. As a result, the business practices of the GSEs affect the entire relationship between them and mortgage insurers and include:

the level of private mortgage insurance coverage, subject to the limitations of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's charters, when private mortgage insurance is used as the required credit enhancement on low down payment mortgages,

whether Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac influence the mortgage lender's selection of the mortgage insurer providing coverage and, if so, any transactions that are related to that selection,

the underwriting standards that determine what loans are eligible for purchase by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, which thereby affect the quality of the risk insured by the mortgage insurer and the availability of mortgage loans,

the terms on which mortgage insurance coverage can be canceled before reaching the cancellation thresholds established by law, and

the circumstances in which mortgage servicers must perform activities intended to avoid or mitigate loss on insured mortgages that are delinquent.

In addition, both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have policies which provide guidelines on terms under which they can conduct business with mortgage insurers with financial strength ratings below Aa3/AA-. In February 2008 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac announced that they were temporarily suspending the portion of their eligibility requirements that impose additional restrictions on a mortgage insurer that is downgraded below Aa3/AA- if the affected insurer commits to submitting a complete remediation plan for their approval. Such remediation plans must be submitted within 90 days of the downgrade to Freddie Mac and within 30 days of the downgrade to Fannie Mae. There can be no assurances that Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae will continue the suspension of these eligibility requirements or that, if we are downgraded below Aa3/AA-, we will be able to submit acceptable remediation plans to them in a timely manner.

We are subject to the risk of private litigation and regulatory proceedings.

Consumers are bringing a growing number of lawsuits against home mortgage lenders and settlement service providers. In recent years, seven mortgage insurers, including MGIC, have been involved in litigation alleging violations of the anti-referral fee provisions of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, which is commonly known as RESPA, and the notice provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, which is commonly known as FCRA. MGIC's settlement of class action litigation against it under RESPA became final in October 2003. MGIC settled the named plaintiffs' claims in litigation against it under FCRA in late December 2004 following denial of class certification in June 2004. Since December 2006, class action litigation was separately brought against a number of large lenders alleging that their captive mortgage reinsurance arrangements violated RESPA. While we are not a defendant in any of these cases, there can be no assurance that we will not be subject to future litigation under RESPA or FCRA or that the outcome of any such litigation would not have a material adverse effect on us.

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In June 2005, in response to a letter from the New York Insurance Department, we provided information regarding captive mortgage reinsurance arrangements and other types of arrangements in which lenders receive compensation. In February 2006, the New York Insurance Department requested MGIC to review its premium rates in New York and to file adjusted rates based on recent years' experience or to explain why such experience would not alter rates. In March 2006, MGIC advised the New York Insurance Department that it believes its premium rates are reasonable and that, given the nature of mortgage insurance risk, premium rates should not be determined only by the experience of recent years. In February 2006, in response to an administrative subpoena from the Minnesota Department of Commerce, which regulates insurance, we provided the Department with information about captive mortgage reinsurance and certain other matters. We subsequently provided additional information to the Minnesota Department of Commerce, and on March 6, 2008 that Department sought additional information as well as answers to interrogatories regarding captive mortgage reinsurance. We understand from conversations with the Minnesota Department of Commerce that the Department of Housing and Urban Development, commonly referred to as HUD, will also be seeking information about captive mortgage reinsurance. As of March 17, 2008, we had not been contacted by HUD. Other insurance departments or other officials, including attorneys general, may also seek information about or investigate captive mortgage reinsurance.

The anti-referral fee provisions of RESPA provide that the Department of Housing and Urban Development as well as the insurance commissioner or attorney general of any state may bring an action to enjoin violations of these provisions of RESPA. The insurance law provisions of many states prohibit paying for the referral of insurance business and provide various mechanisms to enforce this prohibition. While we believe our captive reinsurance arrangements are in conformity with applicable laws and regulations, it is not possible to predict the outcome of any such reviews or investigations nor is it possible to predict their effect on us or the mortgage insurance industry.

We are subject to the risk of private litigation and regulatory proceedings.

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In October 2007, the Division of Enforcement of the Securities and Exchange Commission requested that we voluntarily furnish documents and information primarily relating to Credit-Based Asset Servicing and Securitization LLC, the now-terminated merger with Radian and the subprime mortgage assets in the Company's various lines of business. We are in the process of providing responsive documents and information to the Securities and Exchange Commission.

We understand that two law firms have recently issued press releases to the effect that they are investigating whether the fiduciaries of our 401(k) plan breached their fiduciary duties regarding the plan's investment or holding of our common stock. With limited exceptions, our bylaws provide that the plan fiduciaries are entitled to indemnification from us for claims against them. We intend to defend vigorously any proceedings that may result from these investigations.

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The Internal Revenue Service has proposed significant adjustments to our taxable income for 2000 through 2004.

The Internal Revenue Service has been conducting an examination of our federal income tax returns for taxable years 2000 through 2004. On June 1, 2007, as a result of this examination, we received a revenue agent report. The adjustments reported on the revenue agent report would substantially increase taxable income for those tax years and resulted in the issuance of an assessment for unpaid taxes totaling \$189.5 million in taxes and accuracy related penalties, plus applicable interest. We have agreed with the Internal Revenue Service on certain issues and paid \$10.5 million in additional taxes and interest. The remaining open issue relates to our treatment of the flow through income and loss from an investment in a portfolio of residual interests of Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits, or REMICs. This portfolio has been managed and maintained during years prior to, during and subsequent to the examination period. The Internal Revenue Service has indicated that it does not believe, for various reasons, that we have established sufficient tax basis in the REMIC residual interests to deduct the losses from taxable income. We disagree with this conclusion and believe that the flow through income and loss from these investments was properly reported on our federal income tax returns in accordance with applicable tax laws and regulations in effect during the periods involved and have appealed these adjustments. The appeals process may take some time and a final resolution may not be reached until a date many months or years into the future. In July 2007, we made a payment on account of \$65.2 million with the United States Department of the Treasury to eliminate the further accrual of interest. We believe, after discussions with outside counsel about the issues raised in the revenue agent report and the procedures for resolution of the disputed adjustments, that an adequate provision for income taxes has been made for potential liabilities that may result from these notices. If the outcome of this matter results in payments that differ materially from our expectations, it could have a material impact on our effective tax rate, results of operations and cash flows.

Net premiums written could be adversely affected if the Department of Housing and Urban Development repropose and adopts a regulation under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act that is equivalent to a proposed regulation that was withdrawn in 2004.

Department of Housing and Urban Development, or HUD, regulations under RESPA prohibit paying lenders for the referral of settlement services, including mortgage insurance, and prohibit lenders from receiving such payments. In July 2002, HUD proposed a regulation that would exclude from these anti-referral fee provisions settlement services included in a package of settlement services offered to a borrower at a guaranteed price. HUD withdrew this proposed regulation in March 2004. Under the proposed regulation, if mortgage insurance were required on a loan, the package must include any mortgage insurance premium paid at settlement. Although certain state insurance regulations prohibit an insurer's payment of referral fees, had this regulation been adopted in this form, our revenues could have been adversely affected to the extent that lenders offered such packages and received value from us in excess of what they could have received were the anti-referral fee provisions of RESPA to apply and if such state regulations were not applied to prohibit such payments.

We could be adversely affected if personal information on consumers that we maintain is improperly disclosed.

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As part of our business, we maintain large amounts of personal information on consumers. While we believe we have appropriate information security policies and systems to prevent unauthorized disclosure, there can be no assurance that unauthorized disclosure, either through the actions of third parties or employees, will not occur. Unauthorized disclosure could adversely affect our reputation and expose us to material claims for damages.

The implementation of the Basel II capital accord may discourage the use of mortgage insurance.

In 1988, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision developed the Basel Capital Accord (the Basel I), which set out international benchmarks for assessing banks' capital adequacy requirements, in June 2005, the Basel Committee issued an update to Basel I (as revised in November 2005, Basel II). Basel II, which is scheduled to become effective in the United States and many other countries in 2008, affects the capital treatment provided to mortgage insurance by domestic and international banks in both their origination and securitization activities.

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The Basel II provisions related to residential mortgages and mortgage insurance may provide incentives to certain of our bank customers not to insure mortgages having a lower risk of claim and to insure mortgages having a higher risk of claim. The Basel II provisions may also alter the competitive positions and financial performance of mortgage insurers in other ways, including reducing our ability to successfully establish or operate our planned international operations.

Our international operations may subject us to numerous risks.

We have committed significant resources to begin international operations, initially in Australia, where we started to write business in June 2007. We plan to expand our international activities to other countries, including Canada. Accordingly, in addition to the general economic and insurance business-related factors discussed above, we are subject to a number of risks associated with our international business activities, including: dependence on regulatory and third-party approvals, changes in rating or outlooks assigned to our foreign subsidiaries by rating agencies, economic downturns in targeted foreign mortgage origination markets, foreign currency exchange rate fluctuations; and interest-rate volatility in a variety of countries. Any one or more of the risks listed above could limit or prohibit us from developing our international operations profitably. In addition, we may not be able to effectively manage new operations or successfully integrate them into our existing operations.

We are susceptible to disruptions in the servicing of mortgage loans that we insure.

We depend on reliable, consistent third-party servicing of the loans that we insure. A recent trend in the mortgage lending and mortgage loan servicing industry has been towards consolidation of loan servicers. This reduction in the number of servicers could lead to disruptions in the servicing of mortgage loans covered by our insurance policies. This, in turn, could contribute to a rise in delinquencies among those loans and could have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition and operating results. Additionally, increasing delinquencies have strained the resources of servicers, reducing their ability to undertake mitigation efforts that could help limit our losses.

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Our income from our Sherman joint venture could be adversely affected by uncertain economic factors impacting the consumer sector and by lenders reducing the availability of credit or increasing its cost.

Sherman is principally engaged in purchasing and collecting for its own account delinquent consumer receivables, which are primarily unsecured, and in originating and servicing subprime credit card receivables. Sherman's results are sensitive to its ability to purchase receivable portfolios on favorable terms and to service those receivables such that it meets its return targets. In addition, the volume of credit card originations and the related returns on the credit card portfolio are impacted by general economic conditions and consumer behavior. Sherman's operations are principally financed with debt under credit facilities. Recently there has been a general tightening in credit markets, with the result that lenders are generally becoming more restrictive in the amount of credit they are willing to provide and in the terms of credit that is provided. Credit tightening could adversely impact Sherman's ability to obtain sufficient funding to maintain or expand its business and could increase the cost of funding that is obtained.

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SIGNATURES

Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the registrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf by the undersigned hereunto duly authorized.

MGIC INVESTMENT CORPORATION
By: /s/ Joseph J. Komanecki

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Date: March 20, 2008

Joseph J. Komanecki
Senior Vice President, Controller and
Chief Accounting Officer