UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C. 20549

SCHEDULE 13D

Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Amendment No. 8)

MALVERN FEDERAL BANCORP, INC.

(Name of Issuer)

Common Stock, $0.01 par value
(Title of Class of Securities)

561410 10 1

(CUSIP Number)

Mr. Joseph Stilwell

111 Broadway, 12th Floor

New York, New York 10006

Telephone:  (212) 269-5800

with a copy to:

Spencer L. Schneider, Esq.

70 Lafayette Street, 7^th Floor

New York, New York 10013

Telephone:  (212) 233-7400

(Name, Address and Telephone Number of Person

Authorized to Receive Notices and Communications)

October 26, 2010
(Date of Event which Requires Filing of this Statement)

If the filing person has previously filed a statement on Schedule 13G to report the acquisition that is the subject of this Schedule 13D, and is filing this schedule because of §§240.13d-1(e), 240.13d-1(f) or 240.13d-1(g), check the following box. [   ]

The information required on the remainder of this cover page shall not be deemed to be "filed" for the purpose of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Act") or otherwise subject to the liabilities of that section of the Act but shall be subject to all other provisions of the Act (however, see the Notes).

Item 1.  Security and Issuer

This is the eighth amendment (this "Eighth Amendment") to the original Schedule 13D, which was filed on May 30, 2008 (the “Original Schedule 13D”), and amended on June 27, 2008 (the "First Amendment"), on April 8, 2009 (the "Second Amendment"), on May 11, 2010 (the "Third Amendment"), on May 27, 2010 (the "Fourth Amendment"), on June 23, 2010 (the "Fifth Amendment"), on August 31, 2010 (the "Sixth Amendment"), and on September 29, 2010 (the "Seventh Amendment"). This Eighth Amendment is filed jointly by Stilwell Value Partners VI, L.P., a Delaware limited partnership ("Stilwell Value Partners VI"); Stilwell Partners, L.P., a Delaware limited partnership ("Stilwell Partners"); Stilwell Associates, L.P., a Delaware limited partnership ("Stilwell Associates"); Stilwell Offshore Ltd., a Cayman Islands company ("Stilwell Offshore"); Stilwell Value LLC, a Delaware limited liability company ("Stilwell Value LLC"), and the general partner of Stilwell Value Partners VI and Stilwell Associates; Stilwell Management LLC, a Delaware limited liability company ("Stilwell Management"), and the manager of Stilwell Offshore under a managing agreement; Joseph Stilwell; and John Stilwell.  Stilwell Value Partners VI, Stilwell Partners, Stilwell Associates, Stilwell Offshore, Stilwell Value LLC, Stilwell Management, Joseph Stilwell, and John Stilwell are collectively referred to herein as the "Group."

This statement relates to the common stock, $0.01 par value ("Common Stock"), of Malvern Federal Bancorp, Inc. (the "Issuer").  The address of the principal executive offices of the Issuer is 42 East Lancaster Avenue, Paoli, Pennsylvania 19301.  The amended joint filing agreement of the members of the Group is attached as Exhibit 3 to the Second Amendment.

Item 2.  Identity and Background

(a)-(c)  This statement is filed by Joseph Stilwell with respect to the shares of Common Stock beneficially owned by Joseph Stilwell, including shares of Common Stock held in the names of Stilwell Value Partners VI, Stilwell Partners, Stilwell Associates, and Stilwell Offshore, in Joseph Stilwell's capacities as the general partner of Stilwell Partners, as the managing and sole member of Stilwell Value LLC, which is the general partner of Stilwell Value Partners VI and Stilwell Associates, and as the managing and sole member of Stilwell Management, which is the manager of Stilwell Offshore under a managing agreement.

The business address of Stilwell Value Partners VI, Stilwell Partners, Stilwell Associates, Stilwell Value LLC, and Joseph Stilwell is 111 Broadway, 12^th Floor, New York, New York 10006.  The business address of Stilwell Offshore and Stilwell Management is 315 Clocktower Commons, Brewster, New York 10508.

The principal employment of Joseph Stilwell is investment management.  Stilwell Value Partners VI, Stilwell Partners, and Stilwell Associates are private investment partnerships engaged in the purchase and sale of securities for their own accounts.  Stilwell Offshore is a company formed under the laws of the Cayman Islands engaged in the purchase and sale of securities for its own account.  Stilwell Value LLC is in the business of serving as the general partner of Stilwell Value Partners VI, Stilwell Associates, and related partnerships.  Stilwell Management is in the business of serving as manager of Stilwell Offshore.

This statement is also filed by John Stilwell with respect to the shares of Common Stock beneficially owned by him. John Stilwell’s business address is 111 Broadway, 12^th Floor, New York, New York 10006.  John Stilwell is employed by Stilwell Partners as an analyst. John Stilwell and Joseph Stilwell are brothers.

(d)  During the past five years, no member of the Group has been convicted in a criminal proceeding (excluding traffic violations or similar misdemeanors).

(e)  During the past five years, no member of the Group has been a party to a civil proceeding of a judicial or administrative body of competent jurisdiction and, as a result of such proceeding, was or is subject to a judgment, decree or final order enjoining future violations of, or prohibiting or mandating activities subject to, Federal or State securities laws or finding any violation with respect to such laws.

(f)  Joseph Stilwell and John Stilwell are citizens of the United States.

Item 3.  Source and Amount of Funds or Other Consideration

The amount of funds expended to date by Stilwell Offshore to acquire the 19,000 shares of Common Stock it holds in its name is $178,240.  Such funds were provided from Stilwell Offshore's working capital and, from time to time, in part by margin account loans from subsidiaries of Morgan Stanley extended in the ordinary course of business.

The amount of funds expended to date by Stilwell Value Partners VI to acquire the 435,000 shares of Common Stock it holds in its name is $4,613,553.  Such funds were provided from the working capital of Stilwell Value Partners VI and, from time to time, in part by margin account loans from subsidiaries of Fidelity Brokerage Services LLC extended in the ordinary course of business.

The amount of funds expended to date by Stilwell Partners to acquire the 20,000 shares of Common Stock it holds in its name is $223,000.  Such funds were provided from Stilwell Partners' working capital and, from time to time, in part by margin account loans from subsidiaries of Fidelity Brokerage Services LLC extended in the ordinary course of business.

The amount of funds expended to date by Stilwell Associates to acquire the 106,900 shares of Common Stock it holds in its name is $1,176,280.  Such funds were provided from Stilwell Associates' working capital and, from time to time, in part by margin account loans from subsidiaries of Morgan Stanley extended in the ordinary course of business.

The amount of funds expended to date by Joseph Stilwell to acquire the 20,000 shares of Common Stock he holds in his name is $223,000.  Such funds were provided from personal funds and, from time to time, in part by margin account loans from subsidiaries of JP Morgan Chase & Co. extended in the ordinary course of business.

The amount of funds expended to date by John Stilwell to acquire the 5,000 shares of Common Stock he holds in his name is $55,987.  Such funds were provided from his individual retirement account funds.

All purchases of shares of Common Stock made by the Group using funds borrowed from subsidiaries of Fidelity Brokerage Services LLC, JP Morgan Chase & Co. or Morgan Stanley, if any, were made in margin transactions on their usual terms and conditions.  All or part of the shares of Common Stock owned by members of the Group may from time to time be pledged with one or more banking institutions or brokerage firms as collateral for loans made by such entities to members of the Group.  Such loans generally bear interest at a rate based on the broker's call rate from time to time in effect.  Such indebtedness, if any, may be refinanced with other banks or broker-dealers.

Item 4.  Purpose of Transaction

Our purpose in acquiring shares of Common Stock of the Issuer is to profit from the appreciation in the market price of the shares of Common Stock and through the payment of dividends by asserting shareholder rights.  A majority of the Issuer's outstanding shares are held by Malvern Federal Mutual Holding Company, which is controlled by the Issuer's Board.  We do not believe the value of the Issuer’s assets is adequately reflected in the current market price of the Issuer’s Common Stock.

We are filing this Eighth Amendment to report that today we demanded that the Issuer pursue a derivative action against the directors.  We believe they have breached their fiduciary duties and caused the Issuer damages.  The directors have refused to even consider pursuing a second step transaction.  A copy of the demand letter is attached as Exhibit 8.

Since 2000, affiliates of the Group have filed Schedule 13Ds to report greater than five percent positions in 20 other publicly traded companies.  For simplicity, these affiliates are referred to as the "Group", "we", "us", or "our."  In each instance, our purpose has been to profit from the appreciation in the market price of the shares we held by asserting shareholder rights.  In each situation, we believed that the values of the companies' assets were not adequately reflected in the market prices of their shares.  The filings are described below.

On May 1, 2000, we filed a Schedule 13D to report a position in Security of Pennsylvania Financial Corp. ("SPN").  We scheduled a meeting with senior management to discuss ways to maximize the value of SPN's assets.  On June 2, 2000, prior to the scheduled meeting, SPN and Northeast Pennsylvania Financial Corp. announced SPN's acquisition.  We then sold our shares on the open market.

On July 7, 2000, we filed a Schedule 13D to report a position in Cameron Financial Corporation ("Cameron").  We exercised our shareholder rights by, among other things, requesting that Cameron management hire an investment banker, demanding Cameron's list of shareholders, meeting with Cameron's management, demanding that Cameron invite our representatives to join the board, writing to other Cameron shareholders to express our dismay with management's inability to maximize shareholder value and publishing that letter in the local press.  On October 6, 2000, Cameron announced its sale to Dickinson Financial Corp., and we sold our shares on the open market.

On January 4, 2001, following the announcement by Community Financial Corp. ("CFIC") of the sale of two of its four subsidiary banks and its intention to sell one or more of its remaining subsidiaries, we filed a Schedule 13D to report our position.  We reported that we acquired CFIC stock for investment purposes.  On January 25, 2001, CFIC announced the sale of one of its remaining subsidiaries.  We then announced our intention to run an alternate slate of directors at the 2001 annual meeting if CFIC did not sell the remaining subsidiary by then.  On March 27, 2001, we wrote to CFIC confirming that CFIC had agreed to meet with one of our proposed nominees to the board.  On March 30, 2001, before our meeting took place, CFIC announced its merger with First Financial Corporation, and we sold our shares on the open market.

On February 23, 2001, we filed a Schedule 13D to report a position in Montgomery Financial Corporation ("Montgomery").  On April 20, 2001, we met with Montgomery's management, and suggested that they maximize shareholder value by selling the institution.  We also informed management that we would run an alternate slate of directors at the 2001 annual meeting unless Montgomery were sold.  Eleven days after we filed our Schedule 13D, however, Montgomery's board amended its bylaws to make it more difficult for us to run an alternate slate by limiting the pool of potential nominees to local persons with a banking relation and shortening the deadline to nominate an alternate slate.  We located qualified nominees under the restrictive bylaw provisions and noticed our slate within the deadline. On June 5, 2001, Montgomery announced that it had hired a banker to explore a sale. On July 24, 2001, Montgomery announced its merger with Union Community Bancorp.

On June 14, 2001, we filed a Schedule 13D reporting a position in HCB Bancshares, Inc. ("HCBB").  On September 4, 2001, we reported that we had entered into a standstill agreement with HCBB, under which HCBB agreed to: (a) add a director selected by us, (b) consider conducting a Dutch tender auction, (c) institute annual financial targets, and (d) retain an investment banker to explore alternatives if it did not achieve the financial targets.  On October 22, 2001, our nominee, John G. Rich, Esq., was named to the board.  On January 31, 2002, HCBB announced a modified Dutch tender auction to repurchase 20% of its shares.  Although HCBB's outstanding share count decreased by 33% between the filing of our original Schedule 13D and August 2003, HCBB did not achieve the financial target.  On August 12, 2003, HCBB announced it had hired a banker to assist in exploring alternatives for maximizing shareholder value, including a sale. On January 14, 2004, HCBB announced its sale to Rock Bancshares Inc. and we sold our shares on the open market.

On December 15, 2000, we filed a Schedule 13D reporting a position in Oregon Trail Financial Corp. ("OTFC").  In January 2001, we met with the management of OTFC to discuss our concerns that management was not maximizing shareholder value, and we proposed that OTFC voluntarily place our nominees on the board.  OTFC rejected our proposal, and we announced our intention to solicit proxies to elect a board nominee.  We demanded OTFC's shareholder list, but it refused.  We sued OTFC in Baker County, Oregon, and the court ruled in our favor and sanctioned it.  We also sued two OTFC directors alleging that one had violated OTFC's residency requirement and that the other had committed perjury.  Both suits were dismissed pre-trial but we filed an appeal in one suit and were permitted to re-file the other suit in state court.  On August 16, 2001, we started soliciting proxies to elect Kevin D. Padrick, Esq. to the board.  We argued in our proxy materials that OTFC should have repurchased its shares at prices below book value.  OTFC announced the hiring of an investment banker.  Then, the day after the 9/11 attacks, OTFC sued us in Portland, Oregon and moved to invalidate our proxies; the court denied the motion and the election proceeded.

On October 12, 2001, OTFC's shareholders elected our candidate by a 2-1 margin.  In the five months after the filing of our first proxy statement (i.e., from August 1, 2001 through December 31, 2001), OTFC repurchased approximately 15% of its shares.  On March 12, 2002, we entered into a standstill agreement with OTFC.  OTFC agreed to: (a) achieve annual targets for return on equity, (b) reduce their current capital ratio, (c) obtain advice from an investment banker regarding annual 10% stock repurchases, (d) re-elect our director to the board, (e) reimburse a portion of our expenses, and (f) withdraw their lawsuit.  On February 24, 2003, OTFC and FirstBank NW Corp. announced their merger, and we sold substantially all of our shares on the open market.

On November 25, 2002, we filed a Schedule 13D reporting a position in American Physicians Capital, Inc. ("ACAP").  The Schedule 13D disclosed that on January 18, 2002, Michigan's insurance department had approved our request to solicit proxies to elect two directors to ACAP's board.  On January 29, 2002, we noticed our intention to nominate two directors at the 2002 annual meeting.  On February 20, 2002, we entered into a three-year standstill agreement with ACAP, providing for ACAP to add our nominee, Spencer L. Schneider, Esq., to its board.  ACAP also agreed to consider using a portion of its excess capital to repurchase ACAP's shares in each of the fiscal years 2002 and 2003 so that its outstanding share count would decrease by 15% for each of those years.  In its 2002 fiscal year, ACAP repurchased 15% of its outstanding shares; these repurchases were highly accretive to per-share book value.  On November 6, 2003, ACAP announced a reserve charge and that it would explore options to maximize shareholder value.  It also announced that it would exit the healthcare and workers' compensation insurance businesses.  ACAP then announced that it had retained Sandler O'Neill & Partners, L.P., to assist the board.  On December 2, 2003, ACAP announced the early retirement of its President and CEO.  On December 23, 2003, ACAP named R. Kevin Clinton its new President and CEO.  On June 24, 2004, ACAP announced that it had decided that the best means to maximize shareholder value would be to shed non-core businesses and focus on its core business line in its core markets.  We increased our holdings in ACAP, and we announced that we intended to seek additional board representation.  On November 10, 2004, ACAP invited Mr. Stilwell to sit on the board, and we entered into a new standstill agreement.  This agreement was terminated in November 2007, with our nominees remaining on ACAP's board.  On May 8, 2008, our nominees were re-elected to three-year terms expiring in 2011.  On passage of federal healthcare legislation in 2010, ACAP became concerned about the fundamentals of its business and promptly acted to assess its strategic alternatives.  On October 22, 2010, ACAP was acquired by The Doctors Company in a cash merger.

On June 30, 2003, we filed a Schedule 13D reporting a position in FPIC Insurance Group, Inc. ("FPIC").  On August 12, 2003, Florida's insurance department approved our request to hold more than 5% of FPIC's shares, to solicit proxies to hold board seats, and to exercise shareholder rights.  On November 10, 2003, FPIC invited our nominee, John G. Rich, Esq., to join the board and we signed a confidentiality agreement.  On June 7, 2004, we disclosed that because FPIC's management had taken steps to increase shareholder value and because its market price increased and reflected fair value in our estimation, we sold our shares on the open market, decreasing our holdings below five percent.  Our nominee was invited to remain on the board after we sold our stake.

On March 29, 2004, we filed a Schedule 13D reporting a position in Community Bancshares, Inc. ("COMB").  We disclosed our intention to meet with COMB's management and evaluate management's progress in resolving its regulatory issues, lawsuits, problem loans, and non-performing assets, and that we would likely support management if it effectively addressed COMB's challenges.  On November 21, 2005, we amended our Schedule 13D and stated that although we believed that COMB's management had made good progress, COMB's return on equity would likely remain below average for the foreseeable future, and it should therefore be sold.  On November 21, 2005, we also stated that if COMB did not announce a sale before our deadline to solicit proxies for the next annual meeting, we would solicit proxies to elect our own slate.  On January 6, 2006, we disclosed the names of our three board nominees.  On May 1, 2006, COMB announced its sale to The Banc Corporation, and we sold our shares on the open market.

On June 20, 2005, we filed a Schedule 13D reporting a position in Prudential Bancorp, Inc. of Pennsylvania ("PBIP").  Most of PBIP's shares are held by the Prudential Mutual Holding Company (the "MHC"), which, like the Issuer, is controlled by PBIP's board.  The MHC controls most corporate decisions coming up for a shareholder vote, such as the election of directors.  But regulations promulgated by the FDIC previously barred the MHC from voting on PBIP's management stock benefit plans, and PBIP's IPO prospectus indicated that the MHC would not vote on the plans.  We announced in August 2005 that we would solicit proxies to oppose adoption of the plans as a referendum to place Mr. Stilwell on the board.  PBIP decided not to put the plans up for a vote at the 2006 annual meeting. 

In December 2005, we solicited proxies to withhold votes on the election of directors as a referendum to place Mr. Stilwell on the board.  At the 2006 annual meeting, 71% of PBIP's voting public shares were withheld from voting on management's nominees.

On April 6, 2006, PBIP announced that just after we had filed our Schedule 13D, it had secretly solicited a letter from an FDIC staffer (which it concealed from the public) that the MHC would be allowed to vote in favor of the plans.  PBIP also announced a special meeting to vote on the plans.  We alerted the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the "Fed") about this announcement, and PBIP was directed to seek Fed approval before adopting the plans.  On April 19, 2006, PBIP postponed the special meeting.  The Fed subsequently followed the FDIC's position in September 2006.  In December 2006, we solicited proxies to withhold votes on the election of PBIP's directors at the 2007 annual meeting.  At the meeting, 75% of PBIP's voting public shares were withheld.  Also during the annual meeting, PBIP's President and Chief Executive Officer, in response to a question posed by Mr. Stilwell, was unable to state the meaning of per share return on equity.  On March 7, 2007, we disclosed that we were publicizing the results of PBIP's elections and its directors' unwillingness to hold a democratic vote on the stock plans by placing billboard advertisements throughout Philadelphia.

In December 2007, we filed proxy materials for the solicitation of proxies to withhold votes on the election of PBIP's directors at the 2008 annual meeting of shareholders.  At the February 4, 2008 annual meeting, an average of 77% of PBIP's voting public shares withheld their votes.  Excluding shares held in PBIP's ESOP, an average of 88% of the voting public shares withheld their votes in this election.

On October 4, 2006, we sued PBIP, the MHC, and the directors of PBIP and the MHC in federal court in Philadelphia seeking an order to prevent the MHC from voting in favor of the plans.  On August 15, 2007, the court dismissed some claims, but sustained our cause of action against the MHC as majority shareholder of PBIP for breach of fiduciary duties.  Discovery proceeded and all the directors were deposed.  Both sides moved for summary judgment, but the court ordered the case to trial which was scheduled for June 2008.  On May 22, 2008, we voluntarily discontinued the lawsuit after determining that it would be more effective and appropriate to pursue the directors on a personal basis in a derivative action.  On June 11, 2008, we filed a notice to appeal certain portions of the lower court's August 15, 2007 order dismissing portions of the lawsuit.

We entered into a settlement agreement and an expense agreement with PBIP in November 2008 under which we agreed to support PBIP's stock benefit plans, drop our litigation and withdraw our shareholder demand, and generally support management, and, in exchange, PBIP agreed, subject to certain conditions, to repurchase up to 3 million of its shares (including shares previously purchased), reimburse a portion of our expenses, and either adopt a second step conversion or add our nominee who meets certain qualification requirements to its board if the repurchases were not completed by a specified time.

On March 5, 2010, we reported that our ownership in PBIP had dropped below 5 percent as a result of open market sales and sales of common stock to PBIP.

On January 19, 2006, we filed a Schedule 13D reporting a position in SCPIE Holdings Inc. ("SKP").  We announced we would run our slate of directors at the 2006 annual meeting and demanded SKP's shareholder list.  SKP initially refused to timely produce the list, but did so after we sued it in Delaware Chancery Court.  We engaged in a proxy contest at the 2006 annual meeting, but SKP's directors were elected.  On December 14, 2006, SKP agreed to place Mr. Stilwell on the board.  On October 16, 2007, Mr. Stilwell resigned from SKP's board after it approved a sale of SKP that Mr. Stilwell believed was an inferior offer.  We solicited shareholder proxies in opposition to the proposed sale; however, the sale was approved.

On July 27, 2006, we filed a Schedule 13D reporting a position in Roma Financial Corp. ("ROMA").  Nearly 70% of ROMA's shares are held by a mutual holding company (like ALLB, NECB, PBIP, WMPN, and the Issuer) controlled by ROMA's board.  In April 2007, we engaged in a proxy solicitation at ROMA's first annual meeting, urging shareholders to withhold their vote from management's slate.  ROMA did not put their stock benefit plans up for a vote at that meeting.  We then met with ROMA management.  In the four months after ROMA became eligible to repurchase its shares, it promptly announced and substantially completed repurchases of 15% of its publicly held shares, which were accretive to shareholder value.  In our judgment, management came to understand the importance of proper capital allocation.  Based on ROMA management's prompt implementation of shareholder-friendly capital allocation plans, we supported management's adoption of stock benefit plans at the 2008 shareholder meeting, and we sold our shares in the open market.

  On November 5, 2007, we filed a Schedule 13D reporting a position in Northeast Community Bancorp, Inc. ("NECB").  A majority of NECB's shares are held by a mutual holding company (like ALLB, PBIP, ROMA, WMPN, and the Issuer) controlled by NECB's board. We presented a model stock benefit plan to management that we would support based on a vesting schedule that more closely aligns management's interests to shareholder returns. NECB’s management responded to the proposal with a form letter. On July 1, 2010, we delivered a written demand to NECB demanding to inspect its shareholder list.  On July 22, 2010, NECB announced its first ever share repurchase plan. NECB, however, refused to supply us with the shareholder list.  Therefore, on July 23, 2010, we sued NECB in federal court in New York seeking an order compelling compliance.  On August 31, 2010, NECB produced the list of shareholders to us and we dismissed the lawsuit. We have written to shareholders expressing our belief that NECB’s directors have not properly overseen management.On May 23, 2008, we filed a Schedule 13D reporting a position in William Penn Bancorp, Inc. ("WMPN").  A majority of WMPN's shares are held by a mutual holding company (like ALLB, PBIP, ROMA, NECB, and the Issuer) controlled by WMPN's board.  We hope to work with management in maximizing shareholder value.  We provided a PowerPoint presentation to management regarding our views on capital allocation.

On November 7, 2008, we filed a Schedule 13D reporting a position in Kingsway Financial Services Inc. ("KFS").  We requested a meeting with its CEO and chairman to discuss ways to maximize shareholder value and minimize both operational and balance sheet risks, but the CEO was unresponsive.  We then requisitioned a special shareholder meeting to remove the CEO and chairman from the KFS board and replace them with our two nominees.  On January 7, 2009, we entered into a settlement agreement with KFS whereby, among other things, the CEO resigned from the KFS board and KFS expanded its board from nine to ten seats and appointed our nominees to fill the two vacant seats on the board.  By April 23, 2009, the board was reconstituted with just three of the original ten legacy directors remaining. Also, Joseph Stilwell was appointed to fill the vacancy created by the resignation of one of our nominees, Larry G. Swets, Jr., and our other nominee, Spencer L. Schneider, was elected chairman of the board.  In addition, the CEO and CFO were fired for incompetence and insubordination. By November 3, 2009, all of the legacy directors had resigned from the board.  On May 27, 2010, Mr. Stilwell and Mr. Schneider were re-elected to the board. During the time the Group has had board representation, KFS has sold non-core assets, repurchased public debt at a discount to face value, sold a credit-sensitive asset, disposed of Lincoln General, substantially reduced its expenses, and reduced other balance sheet and operations risks. On June 1, 2010, Mr. Swets was appointed as CEO. 

On December 29, 2008, we filed a Schedule 13D reporting a position in First Savings Financial Group, Inc. ("FSFG").  We met with management in New York.  FSFG announced a stock repurchase plan and began repurchasing its shares.  In December 2009, we reported that our beneficial ownership in the outstanding FSFG common stock had fallen below 5 percent.

On March 12, 2009, we filed a Schedule 13D reporting a position in Alliance Bancorp, Inc. of Pennsylvania ("ALLB").  When we announced our reporting position, a majority of ALLB's shares were being held by a mutual holding company (like NECB, PBIP, ROMA, WMPN, and the Issuer) controlled by ALLB's board. However, on August 11, 2010, ALLB announced its intention to undertake a second step offering, selling all shares to the public.  We strongly support ALLB’s action.

On September 24, 2010, we filed a Schedule 13D reporting a position in FedFirst Financial Corporation ("FFCO").  We hope to work with management and the board to maximize shareholder value.

On October 8, 2010, we filed a Schedule 13D reporting a position in Wayne Savings Bancshares, Inc. ("WAYN").  We hope to work with management and the board to maximize shareholder value.

On October 18, 2010, we filed a Schedule 13D reporting a position in Standard Financial Corp. ("STND").  We hope to work with management and the board to maximize shareholder value.

Members of the Group may seek to make additional purchases or sales of shares of Common Stock. Except as described in this filing, no member of the Group has any plans or proposals which relate to, or could result in, any of the matters referred to in paragraphs   (a) through (j), inclusive, of Item 4 of Schedule 13D. Members of the Group may, at any time and from time to time, review or reconsider their positions and formulate plans or proposals with respect thereto.

Item 5.  Interest in Securities of the Issuer

The percentages used in this filing are calculated based on the number of shares of Common Stock, 6,102,500, reported as the number of outstanding shares as of August 6, 2010, in the Issuer's quarterly report on Form 10-Q filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2010. 

(A)  Stilwell Value Partners VI

(a)     Aggregate number of shares beneficially owned:  600,900
Percentage:  9.8%

(b)     1.  Sole power to vote or to direct vote:  0

2.  Shared power to vote or to direct vote:  600,900

3.  Sole power to dispose or to direct the disposition:  0

4.  Shared power to dispose or to direct disposition:  600,900

(c)     Stilwell Value Partners VI has not purchased or sold any shares of Common Stock since the filing of the Sixth Amendment.

(d)     Because he is the managing and sole member of Stilwell Value LLC, which is the general partner of Stilwell Value Partners VI, Joseph Stilwell has the power to direct the affairs of Stilwell Value Partners VI, including the voting and disposition of shares of Common Stock held in the name of Stilwell Value Partners VI.  Therefore, Joseph Stilwell is deemed to share voting and disposition power with Stilwell Value Partners VI with regard to those shares of Common Stock.

(B)  Stilwell Partners

(a)     Aggregate number of shares beneficially owned:  600,900

Percentage:  9.8%

(b)     1.  Sole power to vote or to direct vote:  0

2.  Shared power to vote or to direct vote:  600,900

3.  Sole power to dispose or to direct the disposition:  0

4.  Shared power to dispose or to direct disposition:  600,900

(c)     Stilwell Partners has not purchased or sold any shares of Common Stock since the filing of the Original Schedule 13D.

(d)     Because he is general partner of Stilwell Partners, Joseph Stilwell has the power to direct the affairs of Stilwell Partners, including the voting and disposition of shares of Common Stock held in the name of Stilwell Partners.  Therefore, Joseph Stilwell is deemed to share voting and disposition power with Stilwell Partners with regard to those shares of Common Stock.

(C)  Stilwell Associates

(a)     Aggregate number of shares beneficially owned:  600,900

Percentage:  9.8%

(b)     1.  Sole power to vote or to direct vote:  0

2.  Shared power to vote or to direct vote:  600,900

3.  Sole power to dispose or to direct the disposition:  0

4.  Shared power to dispose or to direct disposition:  600,900

(c)     Stilwell Associates has not purchased or sold any shares of Common Stock since the filing of the Sixth Amendment.

(d)     Because he is the managing and sole member of Stilwell Value LLC, which is the general partner of Stilwell Associates, Joseph Stilwell has the power to direct the affairs of Stilwell Associates, including the voting and disposition of shares of Common Stock held in the name of Stilwell Associates.  Therefore, Joseph Stilwell is deemed to share voting and disposition power with Stilwell Associates with regard to those shares of Common Stock.

(D)  Stilwell Offshore Ltd.

(a)     Aggregate number of shares beneficially owned:  600,900

Percentage:  9.8%

(b)     1.  Sole power to vote or to direct vote:  0

2.  Shared power to vote or to direct vote:  600,900

3.  Sole power to dispose or to direct the disposition:  0

4.  Shared power to dispose or to direct disposition:  600,900

(c)     Stilwell Offshore has not purchased or sold any shares of Common Stock since the filing of the Sixth Amendment.

(d)     Because he is a director of Stilwell Offshore and is the managing and sole member of Stilwell Management, which is the manager of Stilwell Offshore under a managing agreement, Joseph Stilwell has the power to direct the affairs of Stilwell Offshore, including the voting and disposition of shares of Common Stock held in the name of Stilwell Offshore.  Therefore, Joseph Stilwell is deemed to share voting and disposition power with Stilwell Offshore with regard to those shares of Common Stock.

(a)     Aggregate number of shares beneficially owned:  600,900

Percentage: 9.8%

(b)     1.  Sole power to vote or to direct vote:  0

2.  Shared power to vote or to direct vote:  600,900

3.  Sole power to dispose or to direct the disposition:  0

4.  Shared power to dispose or to direct disposition:  600,900

(c)     Stilwell Value LLC has made no purchases of shares of Common Stock.

(d)     Because he is the managing and sole member of Stilwell Value LLC, Joseph Stilwell has the power to direct the affairs of Stilwell Value LLC.  Stilwell Value LLC is the general partner of Stilwell Value Partners VI and Stilwell Associates.  Therefore, Stilwell Value LLC may be deemed to share with Joseph Stilwell voting and disposition power with regard to the shares of Common Stock held by Stilwell Value Partners VI and Stilwell Associates.

(F)  Stilwell Management LLC

(a)     Aggregate number of shares beneficially owned:  600,900
Percentage:  9.8%

(b)     1.  Sole power to vote or to direct vote:  0

          2.  Shared power to vote or to direct vote:  600,900

          3.  Sole power to dispose or to direct the disposition:  0

          4.  Shared power to dispose or to direct disposition:  600,900

(c)     Stilwell Management has made no purchases of shares of Common Stock.

(d)     Because he is the managing and sole member of Stilwell Management, Joseph Stilwell has the power to direct the affairs of Stilwell Offshore.  Stilwell Management is the manager of Stilwell Offshore under a managing agreement.  Therefore, Stilwell Management may be deemed to share with Joseph Stilwell voting and disposition power with regard to the shares of Common Stock held by Stilwell Offshore.

(G)  Joseph Stilwell

(a)     Aggregate number of shares beneficially owned:  600,900
Percentage:  9.8%

(b)     1.  Sole power to vote or to direct vote:  0

2.  Shared power to vote or to direct vote:  600,900

3.  Sole power to dispose or to direct the disposition:  0

4.  Shared power to dispose or to direct disposition:  600,900

(c)     Joseph Stilwell has not purchased or sold any shares of Common Stock since the filing of the Original Schedule 13D. 

(H)  John Stilwell

(a)     Aggregate number of shares beneficially owned:  5,000

Percentage:  0.001%

(b)     1.  Sole power to vote or to direct vote:  5,000

2.  Shared power to vote or to direct vote:  0

3.  Sole power to dispose or to direct the disposition:  5,000

4.  Shared power to dispose or to direct disposition:  0

(c)     John Stilwell has not purchased or sold any shares of Common Stock since the filing of the Original Schedule 13D. 

Item 6.  Contracts, Arrangements, Understandings or Relationships With Respect to Securities of the Issuer

Other than the Amended Joint Filing Agreement filed as Exhibit 3 to the Second Amendment, there are no contracts, arrangements, understandings or relationships among the persons named in Item 2 hereof and between such persons and any person with respect to any securities of the Issuer, including but not limited to transfer or voting of any of the securities, finders' fees, joint ventures, loan or option arrangements, puts or calls, guarantees of profits, divisions of profits or losses, or the giving or withholding of proxies, except for sharing of profits.  Stilwell Value LLC, in its capacities as general partner of Stilwell Value Partners VI and Stilwell Associates, and Joseph Stilwell, in his capacities as general partner of Stilwell Partners and managing and sole member of Stilwell Value LLC and Stilwell Management, are entitled to an allocation of a portion of profits.

See Items 1 and 2 above regarding disclosure of the relationships between members of the Group, which disclosure is incorporated herein by reference.

Item 7.  Material to be Filed as Exhibits

SIGNATURES

After reasonable inquiry and to the best of our knowledge and belief, we certify that the information set forth in this statement is true, complete and correct.

Date:    October 26, 2010

EXHIBIT 8

Stilwell Value Partners VI, L.P.

111 Broadway, 12^th Flr.

New York, New York 10006

(212) 269-5800

                                                                                                            October 26, 2010

By Federal Express and Facsimile

Board of Directors

Malvern Federal Bancorp, Inc.

42 E. Lancaster Avenue

Paoli, Pennsylvania 19301

Attn:     F. Claire Hughes, Jr., Chairman of the Board

            Shirley Stanke, Corporate Secretary

Re:  Demand to Prosecute Action or Take Corrective Measures

Ladies and Gentlemen:

Stilwell Value Partners VI, L.P. (“SVP”) demands that you commence and prosecute an action on behalf of Malvern Federal Bancorp, Inc. (the “Company”) against the directors of the Company or take the corrective measures listed below. This demand is written in accordance with Section 7.03 of the ALI Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations. SVP is a shareholder of the Company and first purchased shares on May 20, 2008.

Summary

SVP demands that the directors take steps to protect the Company from the directors’ violations of their fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and good faith. As described below, the Company’s directors, unless measures are taken, will continue to act in contravention of their duties of care and loyalty by failing to consider pursuing a “second-step conversion” of the Company. This has caused -- and will continue to cause -- harm and injuries to the Company. For no apparent legitimate reason, the board has refused to consider pursuing a second step conversion. Additionally, by refusing to consider a second step, the directors have acted in a disloyal and conflicted manner because continuation of the mutual holding company structure perpetuates their status as directors (i.e., entrenchment) and attendant powers. By this demand, SVP seeks to compel the directors to reform their behavior and to conform their conduct to the standard required under Pennsylvania law, as well as the Company’s own Code of Conduct.

Parties

SVP is a Delaware limited partnership with its principal place of business located in New York. SVP’s general partner is Stilwell Value LLC, a Delaware limited liability company with its principal place of business in New York. The managing and sole member of Stilwell Value LLC is Joseph Stilwell, who has sole authority to direct the investment decisions of SVP, including its stock purchases of the Company.

Malvern Federal Bancorp, Inc.

October 26, 2010

Page 2

¹ But the Directors have taken advantage of the mutual holding company structure. Upon information and belief, the Directors have never considered anyone for the board other than themselves, cronies, or relatives. When a director retired earlier this year, the seat was filled by the son of a former director. The Directors essentially treat directorships like a family business, and passing one on through a bloodline amounts to an independent breach of their fiduciary duties.

When ALLB announced its second step in August 2010, it cited several reasons -- reasons commonly given by other converting companies: (1) to increase capital and support continued growth and lending capability; (2) to facilitate its ability to acquire other institutions through the issuance of stock; (3) to remove the uncertainties associated with the mutual holding company structure created by the recently enacted financial reform legislation; and (4) to increase the number of outstanding shares held by public shareholders and to have greater liquidity for its stock.

SVP suggested to the Company and Directors that they consider and undertake a second step at this time. Upon information and belief, the Company and the Directors have refused to consider it.

For instance, on June 11, 2010, Messrs. Anderson and Hughes wrote to shareholders expressing their firm resolve – stating it as a “primary” and “corporate” goal -- to remain a mutual holding company. Then, in an October 8, 2010 article in the Philadelphia Business Journal, Mr. Anderson was reported as confirming that a second step was “not on the to-do list right now.” Mr. Anderson was quoted: “We don’t think it’s the right time. . . . [w]e’re working on lowering our nonperforming loan ratios before thinking about anything like that.” (Emphasis supplied.)

The Directors have a fiduciary duty to consider a second step at this time. SVP believes that further delay will cause further harm. There are several reasons why the Directors should undertake a second step at this time.

1.      This summer the Bank was deemed to be in a “troubled condition” by its regulator, the Office of Thrift Supervision, which issued a directive making it harder to work-out non-performing loans. The Directors did not act. On October 19, 2010, because the Bank has engaged in unsafe or unsound practices or violated the law, the Company, MHC, and the Bank entered into Supervisory Agreements with the OTS. Within sixty days the Bank is required to provide a business plan with strategies for “ensuring” that the Bank has the financial wherewithal to support the plan, including “maintain[ing] regulatory capital requirements.” The capital raised from a second step will assist in meeting the OTS’s requirements.

2.      The Company’s nonperforming loan ratio is not an excuse to not “think about” a second step. It’s a good reason to undertake one, at this time. ALLB had a similar ratio and, citing raising capital as a key reason, considered and undertook a second step.

3.      All of the reasons listed by ALLB in its offering documents, including the uncertainty created by the recently enacted financial reform legislation. The time to act is now.

4.      The reasons given by other mutual holding companies that have converted or announced.

Malvern Federal Bancorp, Inc.

October 26, 2010

Page 4

5.      The reasons given by the advisors who are recommending second steps.

6.      A second step is in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders.

The Directors have deliberately chosen not to consider a second step. The refusal to do so has caused and is causing substantial damages to the shareholders for which the Directors should be held accountable. Additionally, the Directors appear to have a conflict of interest-- a second step would likely terminate their directorships and their giving out of directorships. The Directors’ conduct alleged herein is a breach of good faith and their undivided duty of loyalty to the Company, and is a violation of the letter and spirit of the Company’s Code of Conduct and Ethics, which prohibits even the appearance of a conflict of interest. The Directors must consider a second step. And, because of the OTS Supervisory Agreements and the troubled condition of the Bank, the Directors should consider it at once. The Company and Directors should also take steps to remove the conflicts of interest.

Based on the foregoing, the Company should take the corrective action referenced in the previous paragraph or prosecute an action against the Directors seeking to obtain the relief specified therein.

            I look forward to your complete and proper attention to these matters.

Copies to:

Ronald Anderson

Kristin S. Camp

Joseph E. Palmer, Jr.

Stephen P. Scartozzi

Edward P. Shanaughy, II

George E. Steinmetz

Therese Woodman

John B. Yerkes, Jr.